A prominent political analyst has recommended that Bersatu withdraw from the PN coalition while strategically encouraging both Gerakan and MIPP to follow suit, a move that would fundamentally alter the power dynamics of Malaysia's current ruling coalition and expose the ideological fault lines within PAS's leadership.
Lau Zhe Wei, an academic from the International Islamic University Malaysia, argues that such a coordinated departure would achieve a critical political objective: stripping the PAS-dominated coalition of its carefully cultivated multiethnic character. This observation cuts to the heart of how PN has positioned itself since the 2022 general election, when it emerged as a coalition bridging Malay-Muslim and non-Malay constituencies through the participation of non-Muslim led parties.
The suggestion reveals deep analytical thinking about coalition architecture in Malaysian politics. Gerakan, the party that has historically represented Malaysian Chinese interests despite its declining electoral fortunes, and MIPP, which serves as a bridge to East Malaysian communities, both contribute symbolic and substantive multiethnic weight to PN. Their presence alongside PAS has allowed the coalition to claim inclusive governance credentials that would be substantially more difficult to maintain if Bersatu acted alone.
Lau's reasoning appears centred on the proposition that a collective departure, rather than unilateral action by Bersatu, would create a more dramatic political statement and potentially destabilise PN more comprehensively. This approach recognises that Malaysian coalition politics often hinges not just on numerical parliamentary strength but on the narrative legitimacy conferred by diverse representation. A simultaneous exit by three parties, each bringing different constituencies and voter demographics, would present a unified rejection of PN's political direction that would be harder for the coalition to weather.
The recommendation also suggests underlying tensions within PN that extend beyond simple seat-sharing arithmetic. By specifically naming Gerakan and MIPP as parties whose departure would be particularly damaging to PN's image, the analyst implicitly acknowledges that PAS's core voter base operates within a distinctly different ideological and communal framework than the non-Muslim or non-Peninsular Chinese components of the coalition. Without multiethnic components, PN would essentially reveal itself as a Malay-Muslim coalition with PAS at its ideological centre.
For Bersatu, the question of coalition loyalty has been a persistent challenge since its formation and subsequent political maneuvering. The party, founded by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and subsequently led by Muhyiddin Yassin, has navigated multiple coalition arrangements and faces ongoing internal debates about its strategic direction. An exit strategy that involves bringing allied parties along would position Bersatu as the architect of a significant political realignment rather than merely abandoning ship.
The implications for Malaysian governance would be substantial. The current PN coalition, anchored by PAS's 49 parliamentary seats, relies on supplementary support from other parties to maintain governmental control at the federal level and in various states. A departure of multiple coalition members would immediately trigger questions about whether PN retains sufficient parliamentary numbers and, more importantly, whether its ideological composition would make it capable of governing a multi-ethnic nation effectively.
From a Malaysian political perspective, this analysis underscores the precarious nature of contemporary coalition-building in the post-2020 era. The collapse of the Pakatan Harapan government, the subsequent rise of PN, and the ongoing jostling for political advantage have created an environment where coalition stability depends heavily on maintaining the appearance of broad-based support. Any move that exposes the predominantly communal nature of governance arrangements threatens the legitimacy of government itself.
Lau's perspective also carries implications for opposition parties and potential alternative coalitions. Should Bersatu indeed depart and successfully bring Gerakan and MIPP along, the resulting political reconfiguration would create space for different combinations of parties to explore governing arrangements. This could particularly benefit the current Pakatan Harapan alliance, which has struggled to consolidate support across all demographic categories despite its ostensibly multiethnic composition.
The question of timing and execution of such a political realignment remains unclear, as does Bersatu's appetite for such a dramatic move. However, Lau's analysis provides intellectual ammunition for those within Bersatu and allied parties who harbour reservations about the coalition's long-term viability and ideological direction. The recommendation reflects broader anxieties about whether Malaysia's governance can be effectively managed through predominantly single-community coalitions in an increasingly complex political landscape.
Ultimately, the suggestion highlights a fundamental challenge in Malaysian politics: the tension between forming winning coalitions and maintaining the appearance of inclusive governance. Any resolution of this tension through the mechanism Lau proposes would represent a significant moment in Malaysian political recalibration, with consequences extending well beyond the immediate parties involved.
