China's newly appointed ambassador to Australia, Liu Jinsong, has arrived in Canberra and begun his posting with a notably different diplomatic tone. Upon landing in Sydney on Monday, August 24, Liu made a point of taking a public bus to the capital, a deliberate gesture emphasising direct engagement with ordinary Australians. The move appears designed to signal that Beijing is pursuing a more accessible, people-focused approach to its relationship with Canberra, contrasting sharply with the confrontational stance that characterised China-Australia relations under the previous Australian government.
Liu's emphasis on personal interaction during his journey underscores Beijing's broader messaging strategy for the relationship. In a statement released through the Chinese embassy, he described speaking extensively with fellow passengers and expressed genuine enthusiasm about the grassroots experience. This focus on everyday Australians rather than diplomatic platitudes suggests Beijing recognises the importance of rebuilding public sentiment in Australia, where many citizens hold negative views of China formed during years of economic pressure and geopolitical tension.
The backdrop to Liu's posting is the dramatic deterioration in China-Australia relations that unfolded during Scott Morrison's tenure as prime minister. From roughly 2018 onwards, Chinese officials grew increasingly frustrated with Australian moves perceived as anti-Chinese. The government in Canberra pursued legislation targeting foreign interference, effectively blocking the telecommunications giant Huawei from participating in Australia's 5G network rollout, and called for independent investigations into how the Covid-19 pandemic originated in Wuhan. Beijing responded with a suite of economic punishments that battered Australian producers, imposing tariffs and outright bans on coal, barley, wine and other commodities that form crucial parts of the nation's export economy.
The election of Anthony Albanese as prime minister in 2022 marked a significant turning point. Albanese and his government have pursued a more conciliatory approach, recognising that prolonged economic warfare was damaging Australian jobs and communities. The prime minister has visited Beijing twice since assuming office, signalling willingness to engage at the highest levels. Trade relations have gradually normalised, with China progressively removing many restrictions, though some remain in place. This diplomatic thaw has created space for figures like Liu to emphasise renewed cooperation rather than confrontation.
Yet the relationship remains delicate, with multiple sources of friction persisting beneath the surface cordiality. Last month, Australia publicly condemned a Chinese test of a nuclear-capable missile in the South Pacific, characterising the launch as destabilising and provocative. This incident highlighted ongoing strategic concerns in Canberra about Beijing's military modernisation and assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The condemnation demonstrated that Australia, despite seeking better economic ties, is unwilling to ignore security developments it views as threatening regional stability.
Another emerging flashpoint involves rare earths and critical minerals. While China remains Australia's largest customer for iron ore, generating essential export revenue, Canberra has dramatically intensified scrutiny of Chinese corporate investment in the rare earths sector. Australia views control of rare earth processing and refining as strategically vital to its defence capabilities and technological independence. This tension reflects a broader global competition for critical supply chains, with Western democracies increasingly wary of dependence on Beijing for materials essential to modern economies.
In his initial public remarks, Liu attempted to neutralise these tensions by emphasising compatibility rather than competition. He stated that both nations should respect each other's core interests and major concerns, a diplomatic formulation aimed at establishing guardrails around future disagreements. He further stressed the absence of historical grievances between the two countries, the complementary nature of their respective economies, and the enriching qualities of their cultural exchanges. This framing seeks to position economic interdependence and cultural affinity as foundations for moving beyond recent acrimony.
Liu's predecessor, Xiao Qian, had adopted a more combative diplomatic posture, frequently making headlines in Australian media for fiery statements defending Beijing's position on disputed issues. Xiao's tenure, while assertive in protecting Chinese interests, arguably contributed to deteriorating public perceptions and political relations. Liu's appointment signals a strategic shift toward quieter, more consensus-building diplomacy, at least in the short term. His willingness to engage visibly with ordinary citizens rather than remaining cloistered in diplomatic circles represents a conscious choice to rebuild grassroots goodwill.
Prior to his Australian posting, Liu served as the head of the Chinese foreign ministry's Department of Asian Affairs, a position that gave him extensive experience managing sensitive bilateral relationships across the region. Significantly, he was involved in high-profile negotiations with Japanese officials during a diplomatic row triggered by comments on Taiwan made by then-Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. That background indicates Liu is experienced in navigating contentious geopolitical issues and managing the nationalism on both sides that often complicates such disputes. His appointment to Australia suggests China is deploying a seasoned diplomat capable of nuance and careful boundary-setting.
For Malaysia and other Southeast Asian nations, Liu's posting carries broader implications. The improvement in China-Australia relations affects the regional balance of power and shapes how Beijing approaches other complex bilateral relationships. If Liu succeeds in normalising ties while protecting Chinese interests, the model may be replicated with other Western nations. Conversely, if Australia continues to raise security concerns and restrict Chinese investment in strategic sectors, it could signal that economic cooperation and security competition can coexist as competing dynamics within regional relationships. The test of Liu's tenure will be whether people-to-people diplomacy can genuinely overcome structural tensions rooted in differing strategic interests and values.
For Australian businesses, the success of this diplomatic reset could mean further easing of trade restrictions and expanded market access for key export sectors currently facing Chinese barriers. However, officials in Canberra remain acutely aware that China can swiftly reimpose restrictions if political relations deteriorate again. This underlying vulnerability means Australian policymakers will likely continue calibrating their approach to China carefully, seeking to expand economic cooperation while maintaining security vigilance. Liu's arrival in Canberra, marked by his symbolic bus journey, represents a genuine attempt to reset the relationship, but the complex historical context and unresolved strategic differences ensure that genuine trust remains some distance away.
