Germany has emerged as Europe's most hawkish nation on China policy, a shift driven by manufacturing job losses and intensifying competitive pressure rather than ideology. Recent polling reveals that nearly half of all German citizens—49 per cent—regard China primarily as a rival or adversary, a figure substantially higher than France's 43 per cent, the second most sceptical country surveyed across 13 European nations. This hardening of public sentiment comes as Berlin grapples internally with whether to adopt a more assertive trade stance towards Beijing, a debate gaining urgency as economic consequences mount across German industry.
The statistical picture underscores a dramatic reversal in German perceptions. Only 38 per cent of Germans hold positive views of China, characterising it as either a partner or ally. This stands in stark contrast to other European nations: 65 per cent of Spaniards and 62 per cent of Bulgarians maintain favourable assessments of Beijing. The disparity reflects Germany's unique economic exposure to Chinese competition and the tangible costs already being borne by German workers and manufacturers. The European Council on Foreign Relations, a prominent think tank, documented that Germany's manufacturing sector shed approximately 420,000 jobs between 2019 and 2025, with the pace of decline accelerating at roughly 10,000 positions per month. The automotive industry has suffered most acutely, facing displacement in both domestic and international markets by Chinese competitors who have gained dominant positions through subsidised pricing and technological advances in electric vehicle production.
Historically, Germany has resisted EU-wide measures against Chinese economic practices. During 2024, Berlin notably abstained from supporting anti-subsidy duties on Chinese-made electric vehicles that other bloc members endorsed, reflecting the traditional reluctance of German policymakers to antagonise trading partners. This caution stemmed partly from Germany's reliance on China as both a manufacturing hub and market outlet, a relationship that historically appeared mutually beneficial. However, this calculus has shifted as Chinese manufacturers have targeted Germany's core strength—the automotive industry—with increasingly competitive products at lower price points. Economy Minister Katherina Reiche, a member of Chancellor Friedrich Merz's Christian Democratic Union, remains the most reluctant cabinet member regarding confrontational China measures, suggesting that internal government divisions persist even as public opinion hardens.
The political economy of German China sentiment reveals intriguing patterns that challenge conventional assumptions. Mainstream parties—Christian Democrats and Social Democrats—demonstrate nearly identical scepticism, with no fewer than 60 per cent of supporters from both parties viewing China as either a rival or adversary. This convergence across the centrist consensus indicates that tougher China policy enjoys cross-party legitimacy among Germany's political establishment and voters. Surprisingly, the centre-left Social Democrats prove to be the most assertive major party on this issue, with 60 per cent collectively regarding China as rival or adversary. This position differs markedly from European social democratic parties' historical preference for softer engagement with Beijing, suggesting that German workers' immediate economic interests have overridden ideological affinities for softer trade approaches.
The ideological periphery presents a contrasting picture. Germany's far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which currently leads in numerous nationwide polls and is tipped to achieve victory in some provisional elections, maintains distinctly more positive views of China. Approximately 45 per cent of AfD supporters characterise China as a necessary partner, with only 31 per cent viewing it as a rival and 8 per cent as an adversary. The Left party similarly maintains warmer assessments. This pattern reflects both these parties' general scepticism of Atlantic-aligned foreign policy and their emphasis on pragmatic economic relationships unconstrained by values-based considerations. The distribution suggests that any German government pursuing more robust China policies will enjoy strong support among mainstream voters but may face criticism from both extremes of the political spectrum.
A significant development signals that Germany's automotive establishment may be reconsidering its previous stance. The chief executive of Volkswagen, one of Germany's three largest carmakers, recently called on the European Commission to impose tariffs on Chinese plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and publicly praised the very EV duties he had vociferously opposed in 2024. This represents unprecedented territory in recent German-China commercial relations—a major German industrial leader publicly advocating for trade defence measures rather than lobbying Berlin and Brussels for inaction, as has been the default approach for decades. Noah Barkin, a German China policy specialist at Rhodium Group, characterised the shift as reflecting a fundamental recognition: the competitive threat posed by Chinese manufacturers has become so substantial that the historic strategy of industry lobbying against protectionism has become untenable.
The economic logic underlying this reversal merits examination. Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers, often benefiting from state support and access to cheaper inputs, have begun capturing significant market share in Europe. For German automakers, whose traditional competitive advantages rested on engineering excellence and brand prestige, competing against both subsidised pricing and rapid technological iteration from Chinese rivals requires either fundamental restructuring or protective measures. The EV market, crucial for the industry's transition away from combustion engines, represents precisely the sector where China has achieved greatest competitiveness. German manufacturers thus face a dilemma: adopt protective trade measures that might insulate them from direct price competition, or accelerate investment and innovation in electric vehicle technology to match Chinese capabilities—an economically painful proposition for an industry already shedding jobs.
The think tank's analysis suggests that German policymakers need not fear public backlash should they pursue more assertive China policies. If anything, political risk flows in the opposite direction: substantial voter majorities across mainstream parties would likely welcome stronger measures. This finding removes a traditional barrier to policy change, namely the assumption that German voters prioritise cheap imports and open trade above employment protection. The data instead indicates that economic pain has already shifted preferences, creating political space for Berlin to adopt stances previously considered incompatible with German economic interests. The challenge lies partly in overcoming entrenched bureaucratic positions and partly in managing intra-governmental disagreements, as illustrated by Economy Minister Reiche's continued reluctance.
For Southeast Asian economies, Germany's shifting posture carries significant implications. Any hardening of German China policy within the EU framework could accelerate broader European protectionism against Chinese goods and investment, potentially creating spillover effects for regional supply chains. Southeast Asian nations that have positioned themselves as manufacturing alternatives to China or as components of China-centred production networks may find European markets simultaneously closing to Chinese goods whilst remaining cautious about alternative sourcing arrangements. Additionally, Germany's concerns about Chinese market dominance in electric vehicles could influence EU regulations and standards that affect regional automotive exporters seeking European market access. The German shift thus represents not merely an internal European recalibration but potentially a broader realignment of global trade relationships that extends well beyond Europe's borders.
